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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS S. ADAMS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060784-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant was convicted of thirteen counts of forgery, all third degree felonies. 
R. 114-15. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: As president of a land association, defendant wrote $39,382 worth of 
association checks to a management company that he personally owned. He then signed 
the names of two association board members to those checks without their authorization 
and deposited the funds into his management company's bank account. Defendant later 
apologized for taking the money. Was this evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's 
convictions for forgery? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, \5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err by failing to enter a specific finding regarding 
defendant's intent to commit forgery, where defendant had already stipulated to all of the 
elements of the crime, and where the court repeatedly referred to the intent requirement 
when pronouncing judgment? 
Standard of Review: "'[T]he trial court should make findings on all material 
issues tried by the parties, and a failure to do so is generally considered reversible error 
and requires a remand.'" Colonial Pac. Leasing Corp. v. J.W.CJ.R. Corp., 1999 UT App 
91, [^17, 977 P.2d 541 (citation omitted). "However, a trial court's decision may 'be 
affirmed if the failure to make the missing findings can be viewed as harmless error.'" 
Id. (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501(1) (West 2004):1 
A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to 
be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
1
 The 2007 Utah Legislature amended subsection 76-6-501(2) of the statute, which 
is not at issue in this appeal. For convenience, the State cites to the West 2004 version of 
the statute. 
2 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original 
when no such original existed. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-513(2) (West 2004): 
A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary if he deals 
with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of a 
governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner 
which he knows is a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of 
loss or detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was 
entrusted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with thirteen counts of forgery 
and one count of unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary. R. 97-102. Following a 
bench trial, defendant was convicted on the thirteen forgery counts, but acquitted of 
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary. R. 114-15; 159: 122-23. Defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal. R. 148. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The East Park Owners Association (EPOA) is an association of land owners 
created to facilitate real estate development in the Jordanelle area. R. 159: 8-10. 
Defendant was elected president of EPOA shortly after it was formed. R. 159: 85. From 
the outset, EPOA agreed to reimburse defendant for any expenses that he incurred on its 
behalf. R. 159: 86. In May 1996, EPOA's board also voted to award defendant $1000 
per month in salary. R. 159: 85-86. 
As EPOA president, defendant conducted the day-to-day affairs of EPOA. R. 159: 
56-57. Under EPOA's articles of incorporation, outgoing EPOA checks were required to 
have the signatures of at least two board members. R. 159: 123. 
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Defendant owns a management company known as "Bar None." R. 159: 9. 
Through counsel, defendant has stipulated that he and Bar None "are basically one and 
the same." R. 159: 9. From February 27, 1998, to February 28, 2000, defendant wrote 
13 EPOA checks to Bar None. R. 159: 42-45, 67-69. The total value of these checks was 
$39,382. R. 159: 40. Defendant later stipulated he deposited these 13 checks into Bar 
None's account and that Bar None "[c]ertainly . . . got the benefit of those checks." R. 
159: 12.2 
Pete Savas was an EPOA board member during this period. R. 159: 27. Although 
Savas had never given defendant permission to sign his name to any check, defendant 
personally signed Savas's name to eight of the Bar None checks at issue. R. 159: 42-45, 
120. Savas had "major concerns" when he found out that defendant had been signing his 
name to checks, and Savas would have objected even if defendant had only signed his 
name to checks that paid legitimate EPOA bills. R. 159: 35-36. 
Suzie Burton was also an EPOA board member during this period. Like Savas, 
Burton never gave defendant authorization to sign her name to any check. R. 159: 64. 
Defendant nevertheless signed Burton's name to five of the Bar None checks at issue. R. 
159:67-69.3 
The EPOA board learned about these 13 checks sometime in the summer of 2000, 
and defendant was terminated as EPOA president shortly thereafter. R. 159: 32-33, 66. 
2
 The 13 Bar None checks were introduced as Exhibits 1-13 below, R. 159: 42-45, 
67-69, and are in a marked (though non-paginated) manila folder that is included in the 
appellate record. 
3
 Defendant also signed Savas's and Burton's names to "a number of other 
checks" that are not at issue in this criminal case. R. 159: 53, 75. 
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In the spring of 2001, defendant called Savas to discuss the situation. R. 159: 38. During 
that conversation, defendant initially insisted that Savas had "given him authority" to sign 
his name to the checks. R. 159: 39. After Savas denied ever having given him such 
authority, defendant claimed that all of the checks had been for authorized expenses. R. 
159: 39. When Savas refuted that claim, defendant "started to cry and he told [Savas] 
that he - he took it. . . . That he took the money. And that he was going to - - he said he 
was going to repay it and that he'd told [Savas] that he would. . . . And he said to [Savas] 
that he was going to repay it within the next couple, I believe a week, two weeks." R. 
159: 39. As of the time of trial, however, defendant had not repaid the money, but was 
instead claiming that EPOA actually owed him money. R. 159: 25, 114. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 
forgery. Defendant specifically argues that there was no evidence demonstrating 
fraudulent intent. Because defendant did not marshal the evidence supporting the court's 
verdict, however, this Court should decline to address defendant's sufficiency challenge. 
Even if this Court considers this challenge, this Court should hold that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the verdict. It is undisputed that defendant signed the names of two 
EPOA board members to $39,382 worth of checks and that he then deposited that money 
into his own management company's account. Upon discovery, defendant confessed to 
having taken the money and promised to repay it. This evidence was sufficient to convict 
him of forgery. 
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Point II: Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to specifically find 
that he had fraudulent intent. Although the trial court admittedly failed to enter a specific 
finding regarding intent, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that defendant did have 
fraudulent intent. Given that the trial court referred to the intent requirement during the 
trial and again when pronouncing judgment, this Court should conclude that the finding 
of intent was impliedly entered. The trial court's error was therefore harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF 
FORGERY, WHERE DEFENDANT SIGNED THE NAMES OF TWO 
PERSONS TO $39,382 WORTH OF CHECKS, DEPOSITED THOSE 
CHECKS INTO HIS MANAGEMENT COMPANY'S ACCOUNT, AND 
LATER APOLOGIZED FOR HAVING TAKEN THE MONEY 
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of forgery. 
Aplt. Br. 10-20. Defendant specifically contends that there was "no evidence of any 
intent to defraud anyone." Aplt. Br. 15. This Court should reject this argument for two 
reasons. First, defendant did not marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's verdict. 
Second, even if this Court considers defendant's sufficiency challenge on its merits, there 
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's verdict. 
a. This Court should reject defendant's sufficiency claim because 
defendant did not marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
verdict. 
Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a "party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." In order to comply with this requirement, the party must "marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that 
6 
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings against an attack." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, |11 , 999 P.2d 
1252 (internal quotations and citation omitted). A party must also comply with this 
requirement when claiming that the verdict in a bench trial was not sufficiently supported 
by the evidence. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1fl[19-20, 100 P.3d 1177; State v. 
Coonce, 2001 UT App 355,1f4, 36 P.3d 533. 
Although defendant "acknowledges the marshaling requirement in his brief, he 
wholly fails to marshal the evidence supporting the . . . verdict and likewise fails to show 
how it is insufficient to support the verdict." State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 608 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). Defendant has failed to satisfy his marshaling obligation in two respects. 
First, defendant's marshaling section (Aplt. Br. 13-14) omits several pieces of 
evidence that supported the trial court's verdict: 
a) Defendant does not mention the spring 2001 phone call that he had with Pete 
Savas. During this phone call, defendant initially insisted that Savas had given 
him authority to sign his name to checks. R. 159: 39. After Savas denied ever 
having given him such authority, defendant claimed that all of the checks had 
been for authorized expenses. R. 159: 39. When Savas refuted that claim, 
defendant "started to cry and he told [Savas] that he - he took it. . . . That he 
took the money. And that he was going to - - he said he was going to repay it 
and that he'd told [Savas] that he would And he said to [Savas] that he was 
going to repay it within . . . two weeks." R. 159: 39. 
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b) Defendant does not mention that Pete Savas specifically testified that he had 
never given defendant authority to sign his name to any check. R. 159: 36, 
120. 
c) Defendant does not mention that Suzie Burton specifically testified that she 
had never given defendant authority to sign her name to any check. R. 159: 64. 
d) Although defendant argues in his brief that many of these checks were written 
to cover his salary, Aplt. Br. 18, defendant does not mention that that the trial 
court specifically allowed him to claim that salary and accordingly reduced his 
restitution amount by $27,000. R. 159: 126-27; 175: 63. 
e) Although defendant argues that the remainder of these checks were written to 
cover reimbursable expenses, Aplt. Br. 18, defendant does not mention that he 
was given the opportunity to link these checks to reimbursable expenses at 
both the trial and the restitution hearing. R. 159: 125-27; 175:33-40. He also 
fails to mention that the trial court expressly found that defendant had not 
established any link between these 13 checks and any reimbursable expense, R. 
175: 40, 61, a finding that defendant has not challenged on appeal. 
Second, in addition to these omissions, defendant has violated the marshaling rule 
by mischaracterizing much of the testimony that was presented at trial. 
Defendant claims, for example, that Savas "was aware that on numerous prior 
occasions, [defendant] signed Mr. Savas' name to other checks for company expenses 
and apparently had no objection." Aplt. Br. 13 (citing R. 159: 52-53). The cited passage 
discusses one check, not "numerous" checks. R. 159: 52-53. The cited passage also fails 
8 
to support defendant's claim that Savas "apparently had no objection" to defendant's 
practice. In that passage, Savas referred to the check in question as having a "forged 
signature," testified that he had given that check to police officers, and stated that he did 
not know why it, too, had not been the basis for a criminal charge of forgery. R. 159: 53. 
Defendant's suggestion that Savas "apparently had no objection" to his practice is also at 
odds with Savas's direct testimony to the contrary. Savas stated at trial that he had 
"major concerns" when he learned that defendant had been signing his name to checks, 
and he also testified that he would have objected even if defendant had only signed his 
name to checks that paid "legitimate bill[s]." R. 159: 35-36. 
Defendant also claims that "Savas testified that he would have asked for receipts 
for the checks in question but admitted that he never did." Aplt. Br. 14 (citing R. 159: 
48-50). In fact, Savas testified that though he repeatedly asked defendant to turn over the 
corporate books and records during the relevant period, defendant consistently refused to 
do so. R. 159: 31-33. Savas then explained that he had not asked for receipts for the Bar 
None checks during the relevant period only because he had not learned that defendant 
was writing the checks until after defendant's termination as EPOA president. R. 159: 
31-33,49. 
Defendant claims that "Savas testified that as of the date of trial in this case, no 
audit or other financial examination of the transactions of the company had ever been 
conducted by anyone." Aplt. Br. 14 (citing R. 159: 50, 61). Savas testified, however, 
that the EPOA membership passed motions at the 1997 and 1998 annual meetings asking 
that the "books and records be audited by a independent third party accounting firm," but 
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that the audit had never occurred because defendant (who was EPOA's president at the 
time) "never turned the books and records over to a third party accounting firm." R. 159: 
59-60. Savas also testified that although he was not aware of whether a CPA had ever 
conducted an official "audit," he had personally gone "through the books and the records 
that was provided to me, page by page, line by line" through the period of "1997 to 
somewhere in 2000." R. 159: 51. Upon further questioning. Savas reiterated that he and 
other "representatives of the organization" have "gone back and . . . attempted] to see if 
these expenditures in these 13 checks" were for authorized expenses. R. 159: 61-62. 
Defendant claims that Suzie Burton "testified that no audit or other examination of 
company financial transactions had ever been conducted by anyone." Aplt. Br. 14 (citing 
R. 159: 75-78). Burton actually testified that Savas called her in 2000 and asked her to 
review the Bar None checks that bore her signature. R. 159: 64-65. Burton testified that 
although the EPOA board did not conduct a formal audit, the EPOA board "review[ed] 
the books," "research[ed] the checks," and had a meeting to discuss the matter. R. 159: 
65-66. On cross-examination, Burton disagreed with defense counsel's assertion that "no 
attempt has ever been made by your organization . . . to attempt to see if this money was 
in fact due to him," and she reiterated that Savas had led EPOA's internal investigation of 
these checks. R. 159:76-77. 
Defendant claims that during his own case-in-chief, he was "presented by defense 
counsel with copies of each of the thirteen checks in issue" and that he provided a 
"rational explanation for the legitimate company expenses paid in each check." Aplt. Br. 
14 (citing R. 159: 83-120). Defendant's 37-page citation encompasses the entirety of his 
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testimony and does not specify the page on which any particular check was presented or 
discussed. Regardless, defendant's claim that he was presented with the thirteen checks 
at issue and that he then explained each check is inaccurate. Defendant did not discuss 
any particular check on pages 83-92 of his testimony, but instead generally discussed 
EPOA and his role in it. From pages 93-94, he introduced Check 1651, marked it as 
Exhibit 25, and then provided an explanation for it. R. 159: 93-94. Though defendant 
had signed his own name to Exhibit 25, he had not signed the name of any other person 
to it, and it was not one of the 13 checks at issue in the criminal charges. From pages 95-
110 of the transcript, defendant introduced and discussed exhibits 14-21. R. 159: 95-110. 
These exhibits were documents that he had prepared summarizing the expenses that he 
claimed to have incurred on EPOA's behalf during the period in question. R. 159: 95-
110. None of these exhibits make any reference to any of the 13 checks. From pages 
110-112, defendant explained why he felt he could sign Savas's and Burton's names to 
the checks without their permission. From pages 112-114, he discussed exhibits 22 and 
24. Although defendant did sign Savas's name to these two checks, defendant openly 
admitted that these were not part of the 13 -check criminal case. R. 159: 112. This was 
the conclusion of defendant's testimony. Thus, contrary to his claim, defendant was not 
presented with any of the 13 checks at issue during his testimony and he did not offer any 
individualized explanation for any of those checks. 
Utah's appellate courts have historically accepted the lower court's findings when 
the appellant fails to comply with the marshaling requirement. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 
2004 UT App 163, f 11, 92 P.3d 167. In Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, the Utah 
11 
Supreme Court held that while automatic affirmance may not be required in all cases, it is 
still a permissible sanction for a party who fails to properly marshal the evidence. 2007 
UT42atffi[l6-21. 
That sanction is appropriate here. This is not a case where a defendant largely 
complied with the marshaling requirement but then inadvertently omitted a few 
peripheral details. Rather, this is a case in which the defendant omitted several pieces of 
material testimony outright and also mischaracterized much of the testimony that he did 
marshal. According to defendant's version of the facts, his forged signatures were for 
authorized expenses, were never investigated by EPOA, and comported with EPOA's 
approved practices. The testimony below, however, showed that defendant's forged 
signatures were never authorized, were internally investigated by EPOA upon discovery, 
and were for expenses that defendant still could not justify at either his trial or restitution 
hearing. Given defendant's numerous marshaling failures, this Court should decline to 
address the merits of defendant's sufficiency challenge. 
b. Even if this Court addresses defendant's sufficiency challenge on its 
merits, this Court should still hold that there was sufficient evidence 
to support the verdict. 
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because there 
was "no evidence of any intent to defraud anyone." Aplt. Br. 15. This claim should be 
rejected. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the 
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we 
12 
otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. 
Gordon, 2004 UT 2, }^5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
A "person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone," he "makes, 
completes, executes, authenticates, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the 
writing .. . purports to be the act of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (West 
2004). This Court has held that a person has an "intent to defraud" under § 76-6-501(1) 
when the person intends to "'gain some advantage5" through use of the false writing. In 
re P.S., 2001 UT App 305, \\1, 38 P.3d 303 (citation omitted). For example, this Court 
in In re P.S. held that a juvenile who signed a false name to a traffic citation had the 
requisite intent because the juvenile had wanted to gain the advantage of concealing his 
identity from the authorities. Id. at ffi[16-18. 
Defendant argues that he did not have fraudulent intent in this case because the 
checks were written to cover authorized EPOA expenses. Aplt. Br. 16-20. This claim 
should be rejected for three reasons. 
First, the evidence in this case clearly shows that defendant acted with fraudulent 
intent. Defendant not only wrote each of the 13 checks at issue, but he also personally 
signed the names of Pete Savas and Suzie Burton to them as well. R. 159: 6-12. All 
thirteen checks were written to Bar None and were deposited into Bar None's account. 
R. 159: 6-12. Defendant later stipulated that "Bar None and [defendant] are basically the 
same entity for purposes of this trial," and that Bar None "[c]ertainly . . . got the benefit 
of those checks." R. 159: 12. After these checks came to light and the EPOA board 
13 
began investigating, defendant called Savas, tearfully confessed that "he took the 
money/' and promised that he would "repay it" within a couple of weeks. R. 159: 39. 
In promising to "repay" the money, defendant not only acknowledged that he had 
received the benefit of the 13 checks, but also that he was not entitled to the money that 
he had taken. This directly supports the conclusion that defendant gained "some 
advantage" through his conduct, and the trial court was therefore justified in determining 
that defendant acted with fraudulent intent. 
Second, assuming for the sake of argument only that defendant had shown that he 
was entitled to $39,382, this still would not have excused him from criminal liability. 
Defendant essentially claims that there is an entitlement defense to forgery, wherein a 
defendant who forges another person's signature on a check cannot be convicted of 
forgery if the defendant was otherwise entitled to the money at issue. Defendant has not 
pointed to any provision in the forgery statute that creates such a defense, however, nor 
has he pointed to any case in which any court from any jurisdiction endorsed such an 
approach. 
To the extent that defendant has asked this Court to create such a defense, this 
Court should decline the invitation. If defendant's argument were accepted, any creditor 
with access to a debtor's checking information could now satisfy its debts by forging 
checks with impunity. A landlord could write and sign checks on behalf of a delinquent 
tenant, a subcontractor could write and sign checks on behalf of an overdue general 
contractor, or a person could write checks and sign checks from an ex-spouse to recover 
unpaid alimony. While the debts in such cases may be unquestioned, the law already 
14 
provides civil remedies for the satisfaction of debts. Writing another person's name to a 
check without their permission is not one of those remedies. 
Moreover, defendant's fraudulent conduct refutes his claim of entitlement. If 
defendant had truly been entitled to the money in question, he would have simply 
complied with EPOA's check-signing procedures. As recognized by the trial court 
below, "there's a clear reason why the by-laws or the articles of incorporation require 
more than one signature," namely, as a safeguard to prevent fraud. R. 159: 123. The trial 
court found that defendant "knew that and diverted that, or tried to get around it, by 
writing the name of one of the other signatores[, a]nd that they had not given him 
permission to do that." R. 159: 123. Regardless of whether defendant felt that he was 
entitled to the money, the trial court correctly concluded that this conduct constitutes 
forgery. R. 159: 123.4 
Finally, no evidence supports defendant's claim that the checks were linked to 
legitimate EPOA expenses. At trial, defendant claimed that he had receipts that would 
establish such a link, but he told the court that he could not present them that day because 
they were in a file at his office. R. 159: 113. Although the trial court rejected 
defendant's entitlement defense and convicted him of forgery, the court nevertheless 
scheduled a restitution hearing and specifically invited defendant to provide any receipts 
4
 Given defendant's access to the EPOA check book and his demonstrated 
willingness to sign the names of other EPOA board members to EPOA checks, defendant 
could have forged checks to pay EPOA's bills directly (rather than using Bar None's 
checks to pay EPOA's bills), thus avoiding the need to be reimbursed altogether. 
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that would establish a link between the 13 checks and any legitimate EPOA expense. R. 
159: 123-129. 
Prior to the restitution hearing, defendant submitted a binder that contained a 
number of checks that he had written on EPOA's behalf, a number of self-produced 
spreadsheets showing the expenses that he claimed to have incurred on EPOA's behalf, 
and a few receipts. R. 175: 33-40.5 This binder did not, however, specifically link any 
particular receipt to any of the 13 Bar None checks. When defendant took the stand at 
the restitution hearing, he was asked whether he could link any of the 13 checks to any 
particular expense or receipt. He could not. R. 175:33-40. 
The trial court accordingly found that "none of the receipts that [defendant] 
compiled correlate with the checks5' at issue. R. 175: 61. Defendant has not challenged 
that finding on appeal, nor has he pointed to any place in the record where he otherwise 
established a link between any reimbursable expense and any of the 13 checks. Thus, 
even if there were an entitlement defense to forgery, defendant could not claim the 
benefit of that defense on appeal because he has consistently failed to demonstrate that he 
was actually entitled to the money at issue. 
In sum, the law does not allow for the unilateral appropriation of another person's 
signature as a means of recovering overdue payments, even where those payments are 
legitimately due. Defendant in this case signed the names of two other persons to 
5
 Like the trial exhibits, this binder is in a marked (though non-paginated) manila 
folder that is included in the appellate record. 
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$39,382 of checks, he deposited those checks into his own management company's 
account, he admitted that his company received the benefit of those checks, and he later 
apologized to an EPOA board member for having taken the money. Defendant's forgery 
convictions should be affirmed. 
II. ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY FIND 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD FRAUDULENT INTENT, THIS FAILURE 
WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred by failing to specifically find that 
he had fraudulent intent. Aplt. Br. 20-23. Although the trial court admittedly failed to 
issue a specific finding regarding defendant's intent, R. 159: 122-24, any error was 
harmless. 
"'It is well settled that the trial court should make findings on all material issues 
tried by the parties, and a failure to do so is generally considered reversible error and 
requires a remand.'" ColonialPac. Leasing Corp. v. J. W.CJ.R. Corp., 1999 UT App 91, 
[^17, 977 P.2d 541 (citation omitted). "However, a trial court's decision may 'be affirmed 
if the failure to make the missing findings can be viewed as harmless error.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). Harmless error in this context ucan occur two ways: (1) if the undisputed 
evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on which the findings are missing, or (2) 
even given controverted evidence . . . if the absent findings can reasonably be implied." 
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The missing finding in this case qualifies 
under both exceptions. 
First, the undisputed evidence established that defendant acted with fraudulent 
intent. It is well-accepted in Utah that "the act of completing [a forged] check implies a 
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purpose to defraud." State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Thus, "'a false writing has such an obvious tendency to accomplish fraud that the jury is 
warranted in inferring such an intent from the mere creation of an instrument that is 
false."' Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ^[13, 988 P.2d 949 ("Under current Utah law, a 
person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of 
the forgery."); 36 Am Jur.2d Forgery § 53 (2007) ("The defendant's intent to defraud, 
which is an essential element of the offense[ ] of forgery . .. need not be proven by 
positive and direct evidence. The circumstances surrounding the particular transaction 
may give rise to a presumption, or inference of the defendant's intent."). 
Defendant stipulated that he wrote the 13 checks, that all of the checks were 
written to his management company, that he personally signed the names of other persons 
to the 13 checks, and that his management company received the benefit of those checks. 
R. 159: 6-12. "[Stipulated facts are themselves 'the functional equivalent' of findings of 
fact," and "judicial findings of fact would have added nothing in this case since the facts 
had already been 'found' by the parties and were set forth in their stipulation." Dover 
Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Invs., 766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation 
omitted). Under Williams and its progeny, these stipulations alone satisfied the 
fraudulent intent element of the statute, and further findings were therefore unnecessary. 
Second, even if this Court concludes that there was some evidentiary dispute about 
defendant's intent, the finding of fraudulent intent can still reasonably be implied. 
"'Unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court 
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actually considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve 
the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual determination it made.'" Colonial 
Pac. Leasing Corp., 1999 UT App 91 at f l8 (citation omitted). 
After accepting the defendant's stipulations at the beginning of the trial, the trial 
court allowed defendant's counsel to make an opening statement. The court later 
interrupted that statement to comment that "you need criminal intent, you need the mens 
rea and I'm questioning whether that existed.... I mean, I think that is the question." R. 
159: 21-22. After hearing the evidence, however, the court clearly resolved that question 
in favor of the State. After both parties had rested, the court expressly noted that the 
forgery statute requires "the purpose to defraud anyone or . . . knowledge that you are 
perpetrating a fraud by anyone." R. 159: 122. The court recited the additional elements 
of the statute, summarized the evidence, and then found "that the State has proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt forgery." R. 159: 122-23. This record therefore demonstrates 
that the trial court was aware of the fraudulent intent requirement and that it found that 
defendant's fraudulent intent had been proven. This Court can therefore reasonably 
imply that that finding should have been entered and deny defendant's claim. 
In response, defendant suggests that the trial court could not have determined that 
he had fraudulent intent to commit forgery because such a finding would have been 
inconsistent with the acquittal on the charge of unlawful dealing of property by a 
fiduciary. Aplt. Br. 22-23. Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the verdicts in this 
case are not inconsistent. "When multiple crimes are charged and when those crimes 
each require proof of different elements, there is no inconsistency between guilty verdicts 
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on some and not guilty verdicts on others." State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah Ct App. 1989) 
(holding that two verdicts were not inconsistent where the separate crimes had separate 
mens rea requirements). 
As discussed above, the forgery statute requires the use of a false document with a 
"purpose to defraud anyone," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1), and that statute has been 
interpreted to require proof that the defendant had the intent to gain some advantage 
through use of the forged document. By contrast, the unlawful dealing of a property by a 
fiduciary statute requires knowledge that the defendant is "dealing with property . . . in a 
manner which he knows is a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of 
loss or detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was 
entrusted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(2) (West 2004). 
These statutes clearly have different elements. Forgery does not require any proof 
of fiduciary duty, nor does it require any proof that the defendant's actions involved a 
substantial risk of loss. By contrast, unlawful dealing of property does not require the use 
of any false document, nor does it require any fraudulent intent. Thus, there was nothing 
inconsistent about the trial court's verdicts. 
Regardless, the alleged inconsistency still does not negate the trial court's ability 
to have convicted defendant on the thirteen forgery counts. In Hancock, this Court held 
that "the inconsistency of verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts 
aside." 874 P.2d at 134 (internal quotations and citation omitted). As discussed above, 
the trial court's conclusion that defendant committed thirteen acts of forgery was 
20 
supported by the evidence, and defendant therefore has not demonstrated that there was 
any reversible error in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted June 2S
 % 2007. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
O. T 
RYAN D. TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on JuneZ^ , 2007,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, by causing them to be delivered by first class 
mail to his counsel of record as follows: 
Stanley S. Adams 
680 E. 600 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
T>1 % A 
22 
